Ground-penetrating radar (GPR) is one of the most popular and successful sensing modalities that have been investigated for landmine and subsurface threat detection. Many of the detection algorithms applied to this task are supervised and therefore require labeled examples of threat and nonthreat data for training. Training data most often consist of 2-D images (or patches) of GPR data, from which features are extracted and provided to the classifier during training and testing. Identifying desirable training and testing locations to extract patches, which we term "keypoints," is well established in the literature. In contrast, however, a large variety of strategies have been proposed regarding keypoint utilization (e.g., how many of the identified keypoints should be used at threat, or nonthreat, locations). Given a variety of keypoint utilization strategies that are available, it is very unclear: 1) which strategies are best or 2) whether the choice of strategy has a large impact on classifier performance. We address these questions by presenting a taxonomy of existing utilization strategies and then evaluating their effectiveness on a large data set using many different classifiers and features. We analyze the results and propose a new strategy, called PatchSelect, which outperforms other strategies across all experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
A POPULAR approach for detecting buried threats, such as landmines and other explosive hazards, is the use of remote-sensing technologies. One of the most successful modalities for remote sensing of buried threats is the groundpenetrating radar (GPR) [1] - [5] . A typical GPR consists of an array of antennas that are directed toward the ground. An individual GPR antenna operates by emitting a radar signal toward the ground and then measuring the energy that is reflected back. The result of this sensing process is a time series of energy measurements for the given antenna, referred to as an A-scan [6] .
In the context of buried threat detection (BTD), GPR sensors collect A-scans at regular spatial intervals as they move across the surface of the ground (e.g., on the front of a vehicle as it drives forward). The resulting A-scans, each collected at a different spatial location, can then be concatenated to form images of the subsurface, termed B-scans [1] , [2] , [7] . B-scans have one spatial axis and one temporal axis. The signals returned from buried threats typically exhibit characteristic hyperbolic patterns in the B-scans, which can be leveraged for detection [6] , [8] - [10] . Fig. 1 shows several examples of B-scans collected over buried threats. Although it is possible to manually identify buried threats in GPR data, a great deal of published research has focused on automating this process with computer algorithms that provide a confidence of buried threat presence at each spatial location [4] , [7] , [8] , [11] - [15] . Proposed algorithms have employed a variety of techniques from statistics [16] , [17] , computer vision [6] , [18] , [19] , and machine learning [7] , [20] , [21] . The most successful approach to date involves the use of supervised learning techniques [12] , [22] - [26] .
A typical processing pipeline for supervised detection algorithms begins with a "prescreening" operation, in which a relatively fast algorithm is applied to the full set of GPR data (e.g., a 3-D volume or B-scan) in order to identify a smaller subset of spatial locations on the ground, which are subsequently processed by the supervised algorithms. Prescreening is used primarily because it dramatically reduces the amount of data required for both training and testing supervised algorithms, making it possible to apply such algorithms in real-time applications (e.g., on a truck while driving). In the second step of processing, one or more 2-D patches of GPR data are extracted at each prescreener alarm location, and a (trained) supervised algorithm is applied to the patches in order to predict whether each alarm location is a threat, or nonthreat.
In order to train supervised classifiers, they must be provided with examples of data from each class (i.e., threat and nonthreat). As mentioned earlier, training examples most often consist of small image patches that are extracted from B-scans at locations in the GPR volume where useful signals (i.e., those corresponding to both threats and suspicious nonthreats) are estimated to exist [1] , [4] , [6] - [8] , [12] , [27] - [31] . In this paper, we refer to these useful signal locations as "keypoints." The performance of supervised algorithms depends strongly upon the training data that the algorithm is provided, and as a result, the way in which keypoints are identified and utilized forms an important design choice for supervised GPR algorithms.
A. Keypoint Identification
A GPR keypoint consists of a spatial location as well as a temporal location (or sometimes depth). The way in which keypoints are identified is fairly consistent in most existing GPR-based threat detection research. The spatial location is typically either known in advance because the objects were deliberately buried [1] , [6] or estimated using a detection algorithm (sometimes called a prescreener) that precedes supervised classification algorithms [1] , [6] , [7] , [11] , [12] , [32] , [33] .
Once the spatial location is obtained, the temporal location can be estimated. By far, the most common approach for temporal location estimation relies on extracting keypoints at locations of high energy (e.g., local maxima) in the GPR A-scans [6] , [8] , [19] , [28] , [9] , [34] - [37] . These energybased methods often yield multiple keypoints at each spatial location. Fig. 2 illustrates a previously proposed method [9] , which we term the max-smoothed-energy keypoint (MSEK) approach. This method is energy based, which is representative of most existing temporal identification approaches, though some others do exist [8] , [10] , [37] - [39] . While MSEK is performed on A-scan data only, identifying the temporal keypoint is accomplished in the context of its surrounding data; MSEK is run only on the central A-scan of spatial keypoints identified by the prescreener. Additional temporal keypoints could possibly be identified from B-scan data rather than from the central A-scans; however, it is difficult to precisely predict the number of keypoints this would yield or whether they would be useful for extracting training data compared to those in the central A-scan, and therefore, this is not considered in this paper.
B. Keypoint Utilization
Although there is a general consensus in the literature about how to identify keypoints (i.e., that regions of high radar amplitude are of interest), there is relatively little agreement regarding keypoint utilization. Here, keypoint utilization will refer to the process of deciding which keypoints, of those identified, should be provided to the supervised classifiers for training, as well as testing. Consider first the problem of keypoint utilization for training. Keypoint identification approaches, such as MSEK, yield multiple keypoints at each spatial location. As a result, it is unclear as to which keypoints should be retained for training, and this ambiguity is evidenced by the large number of keypoint utilization approaches that have been proposed in the literature (see Section II). To date, it is unclear as to which of these utilization strategies are best, or whether there are any generally superior approaches at all.
Similar design choices must be made for keypoint identification during algorithm testing as well: given a spatial location generated by a prescreener, which temporal locations should be evaluated by the (trained) classifier? Further, given multiple decision statistics at each spatial location, how should a final, single, statistic be computed? Similar to utilization for training, a large variety of utilization approaches have been employed in the literature during testing [9] , [34] , [35] , [37] , [40] , [41] , and it is likewise unclear as to which existing strategies, if any, are superior.
C. Contributions of This Paper
In this paper, we investigate the problem of keypoint utilization during both training and testing. We present a taxonomy of existing keypoint utilization strategies and then compare their effectiveness on a large data set of GPR data using several combinations of state-of-the-art classifiers and features. The results indicate that keypoint utilization can have a significant impact on the classification performance, and that some utilization strategies do generally outperform others. Further, we introduce and apply a new utilization method that was inspired by the comparison of existing methods. This proposed method, called "PatchSelect," outperforms all existing methods across all combinations of features and classifiers tested in this paper. As further analysis, we present several small-scale experiments that motivated the design of PatchSelect besides elucidating effective practices for keypoint utilization. We also relate these practices to inherent qualities of GPR imagery for the lessons in this paper to be applicable in other contexts with a similar difficulty in defining the threat signal.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present a taxonomy of different keypoint utilization methods that have been proposed in the literature. In Section III, the experimental design of a large-scale comparison of keypoint utilization strategies is explained. In Section IV, the results of the comparison are presented. In Section V, small-scale experiments motivating PatchSelect are presented. In Section VI, the specific choices of Patch-Select are related to inherent qualities of the GPR imagery. In Section VII, conclusions are drawn and recommendations are given for the design of future BTD systems.
II. KEYPOINT UTILIZATION STRATEGIES
In this section, we present a taxonomy of existing keypoint utilization strategies that have been employed in the literature. Keypoint utilization strategies, as defined here, consist of two components: one component for training and the other for testing. We will present a taxonomy of existing methods based on a few characteristic differences they have during both training and testing. Table I presents the taxonomy of each existing method, as well as our proposed method, PatchSelect.
A. Strategies for Training
During training, there are two main characteristics that differentiate existing keypoint utilization strategies: the number of keypoints extracted at each spatial location, denoted by K , and how this number varies between threat locations and nonthreat locations.
For example, many strategies utilize keypoints at the top K energy locations, where K is the same for both threat and nonthreat cases [2] , [6] , [9] , [18] , [20] , [34] , [36] - [39] . In contrast, in [28] , [40] , and [42] , a different K is used for threat and nonthreat cases. Other strategies use energy keypoints for threat cases but extract data for nonthreat cases at regular or random intervals down the A-scan (i.e., no estimation of nonthreat data localization is performed) [2] , [7] , [20] , [28] , [40] - [42] . Finally, in [26] , every time point is considered in training as a keypoint for both classes. These methods are listed in Table I , where each method's keypoint utilization strategy for threat and nonthreat is listed.
B. Strategies for Testing
The characteristics that differentiate utilization strategies during testing are very different than those during training. The primary reason for this is that during testing, the primary goal of utilization is to obtain a single decision statistic for each spatial location. Every spatial location consists of many potential keypoints (one keypoint at each temporal location), and therefore, we must decide: 1) how many total keypoints ,   TABLE I   TABLE OF EXISTING KEYPOINT UTILIZATION STRATEGIES, INCLUDING  THE PROPOSED METHOD, PATCHSELECT. IN TRAINING, THE NUMBER  OF PATCHES FOR THREATS AND NONTHREATS ARE GIVEN. IN BOTH  CASES, IF NO PARENTHESIS IS WRITTEN, THEN THE LOCATIONS  ARE CHOSEN USING AN ENERGY-BASED TEMPORAL denoted by L, should be utilized to compute a final decision statistic at that location and 2) upon what criteria (e.g., energy) should we choose these keypoints. In the remainder of this section, we explain the common approaches existing utilization methods take to address these questions, and we include these into our taxonomy in Table I . Existing strategies typically choose which keypoints to utilize based on one of the two ordering criteria. The first ordering criterion is to utilize keypoints at maximum energy locations; in the same way, it is done during training [8] , [10] , [34] , [37] , [43] . This is denoted by "En" in Table I . The second ordering criterion is to utilize the largest classifier decision statistics, denoted by "DS" in Table I . In this scenario, the classifier is applied at regular intervals along the A-scan and keypoints at L locations with the largest classifier decision statistics are utilized [6] , [7] , [11] , [27] . The strategies in [8] , [10] , [19] , [34] , [35] , [37] , and [43] set L = K , so that the same number of keypoints are utilized in training and testing.
Once an ordering criterion for the set of L testing keypoints is chosen, a final decision statistic must be computed. At a spatial location, the strategy's ordering criterion (i.e., En/DS) is used to organize the decision statistics d i according to
where d (r) is the r th order statistic [44] and T is the total number of decision statistics computed at that spatial location. The final decision statistic is obtained using a sum of the L largest order statistics. In Table I , each method is parametrized by its ordering criterion and the number of the top order statistics that are summed.
C. PatchSelect
The training and testing strategies described in this section are summarized in Table I , along with the proposed Patch-Select method. PatchSelect consists of training on the top four energy keypoints for threats and on patches extracted at small, regular intervals along the central A-scan for nonthreats. In testing, the sum of the top 12 decision statistics is reported as the final confidence.
To determine the specific design choices for the PatchSelect strategy, a series of experiments was conducted (described in Section V) to identify which utilization characteristics tend to yield better performance. In particular, we investigate the impact of several characteristics in Table I that we used to taxonomize existing methods (e.g., how many H 0 s to use in training). The results of these experiments reveal good general practices for keypoint utilization and motivated our design of PatchSelect.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we present an experimental method used for comparing the keypoint utilization strategies shown in Table I . The utilization strategies are compared by evaluating the performance of several state-of-the-art feature sets and classifiers when each of the keypoint utilization strategies is employed during training and testing.
A. Evaluation Data Set
The data used in this paper were collected using a downward looking GPR (similar to the one described in [32] ), at a western U.S. test site over a total area of 167167.3m 2 . The data were collected over eight test lanes for a total of 75 runs over all of the lanes. The data set includes 1967 threat encounters. From this collection of data, spatial and temporal locations must be identified to act as training and testing data for threats and nonthreats.
To identify spatial locations of interest for threats and nonthreats, a prescreener can be used [1] , [8] , [26] , [31] , [42] . For alarms to correspond to threats, GPS data are collected along with the GPR data, where the GPS locations of buried threats are known a priori. The remaining alarms correspond to nonthreats and are used for training the algorithm to recognize nonthreats, because those are the instances it will have to classify at test time. In this paper, the energy-based F1V4 prescreener [45] is used, which identifies locations with anomalous energy profile compared to the relatively unchanging background. A sensitivity threshold is set for the prescreener which yields a data set of 1771 threat alarms and 640 nonthreat alarms. This threshold was chosen to achieve the highest possible probability of detection with this prescreener at an operationally feasible false alarm rate (FAR) (number of false alarms per unit area). 
B. MSEK for Keypoint Identification
Given spatial locations generated by the F1V4 prescreener, keypoint identification was performed using the MSEK algorithm, which was first introduced in [9] and has been employed in [6] , [18] , [20] , [35] , and [46] . The process of obtaining temporal keypoints using MSEK is illustrated in Fig. 2 . In MSEK, the data are depth normalized, the central A-scan is squared and smoothed, and the keypoints are identified at the maximum values in the transformed A-scan. A patch of data can then be extracted at each maximum location, examples of which are shown in Fig. 3 . The smoothing parameter controls the maximum number of local maxima that can be identified in A-scan. Further, if two locations have the same energy amplitude, the location of the earlier time index is chosen first corresponding to a higher likelihood of threat presence earlier in time. While other methods exist for temporal keypoint localization, MSEK is representative of methods relying on the measured amplitudes and is simple to implement and use. For this reason, only MSEK is used for keypoint identification with this data set.
C. Feature Sets and Classifiers
Different keypoint utilization approaches that are summarized in Table I are evaluated using several combinations of features and classifiers to investigate the methods that tend to be the most effective. Following the approach for evaluating a BTD algorithm described in [6] , features are extracted at each keypoint and are used to train and test classifiers. These features and classifiers were chosen because they have been used frequently in the GPR BTD literature [6] , [8] , [18] , [27] , [36] . The resulting feature and classifier combinations are referred to as BTD algorithms.
The features considered in this paper are extracted on subimages of the B-scan, referred to as patches, which are taken at keypoint locations. In this paper, the data patches are 18 × 18 pixels and are rescaled to have values between −1 and 1. The patch-size choice is an important consideration that can impact algorithm development and performance, which is outside the scope of this paper (see Section VI-A for further discussion). To choose the patch size, there were two steps. First, we chose a patch size which seemed to encompass the spatial and temporal extent of an average buried threat's signal in our data (i.e., include the reflections associated with the threat signal without including substantial background data). Second, we refined this initial guess of the patch size through a grid search of similar patch sizes. Specifically, we evaluated the performance of a histogram of oriented gradient RF (HOG-RF) classifier [6] when applied with several patch sizes. For the experiments in this paper, we chose the patch size that yielded the best performance among all those considered, which was 18 × 18 pixels.
In this paper, we consider several sets of features that have recently been applied for BTD with GPR: the raw data (rasterized) (see [23] , [47] ), HOG features (see [6] , [8] , [48] ), and edge histogram descriptor (EHD) features (see [7] , [27] , [49] ). To match the results from [6] , the parameter choices for HOG and EHD, which are independent of the data resolution, are kept the same. The HOG feature is computed in cells (data dependent), normalized in blocks of 3 × 3 cells, and with nine angle bins. The HOG cell size is set to 6 × 6 pixels, which performed best in classification with the RF among several candidate cell sizes. The EHD feature is computed with a threshold of 0.15 for declaring a gradient as "no edge." This value depends on the scaling of the data and was chosen based on achieving the highest classification performance using an RF classifier among several candidate thresholds.
We used two classifiers in this paper: 1) a radial basis function support vector machine (SVM) [50] and 2) a random forest classifier (100 trees, two variable splits at nodes, with central axis projection) [51] . These two classifiers were chosen because of their recent application to GPR, resulting in state-of-the-art detection performance [6] , [8] , [12] , [35] , [43] , [52] , [53] .
D. Cross-Validation and Performance Metrics
In this paper, we trained and tested each classifier using fourfold cross-validation. This is a common approach for evaluating the performance of machine learning algorithms, and has been employed previously for BTD with GPR data [6] , [19] , [27] . Additional care had to be taken in our experiments because the GPR data are collected over the same lane multiple times. As a result, all alarms within a certain spatial distance were clustered and assigned to the same fold, to avoid training and testing over the same physical area. To properly handle the issues associated with proper crossvalidation on this type of data set, researchers at the University of Florida developed software, which is used here and has been used in [1] , [6] , [7] , [11] , [28] , and [33] .
To compare the detection performance of each trained classifier, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves are used. ROC curves are a common metric for comparing machine learning algorithms, and they are likewise popular in the BTD algorithm research literature [1] , [6] , [7] , [11] , [28] , [33] . ROC curves plot the relationship between the false detection rate (x-axis) and true detection rate (y-axis) of a detection algorithm, as the sensitivity of the algorithm is varied. In the BTD literature, it is common to scale the x-axis of the ROC curve to report the FAR in terms of false alarms per square meter [1] , [11] , [53] , and we adopt this practice here.
The ROC curve can also be summarized with a single statistic. One commonly used statistic for this purpose is the partial area under the ROC curve (pAUC). This metric is obtained by computing the area under the ROC curve between two FAR values (e.g., 0 and 0.005 FAR). pAUC is frequently used for performance comparisons in the BTD literature [9] , [32] , [52] , [54] , [55] .
To clarify the statistical significance of the differences between the pAUCs of different methods in this comparison, the variance of the pAUCs is estimated using the bootstrap method [56] . To compute the variance of the pAUC of a single algorithm, multiple pAUC values are computed from the confidences output by that algorithm. Computing multiple pAUCs is possible by sampling the set of confidences N times with replacement and thereby randomly generating N data sets. Estimating the variance of the pAUC in this way measures the sensitivity of the performance as a function of the data set. Using the bootstrap here, we set N = 20 and the average pAUC and the standard deviation are estimated.
IV. COMPARISON OF KEYPOINT UTILIZATION STRATEGIES
This section presents the results from the comparison of the 11 keypoint utilization strategies listed in Table I and discussed above.
A. Performance of Keypoint Utilization Strategies
Results of this evaluation are shown in Fig. 4 , where the pAUCs of the ten strategies from the literature and PatchSelect are grouped by their performance under different feature and classifier combinations. We make several observations of the outcome indicated by these results.
First, error bars were added to the comparison to indicate a likely range of variance of pAUC for each strategy. The error bars measure the effect of changes in the data set on the performance of each strategy. The likely performance range of each strategy can be seen to be much smaller than the range of performances exhibited by choosing a different strategy to training any particular algorithm. This further indicates the importance of properly choosing the strategy with which to train and test an algorithm.
Second, the choice of keypoint utilization strategy can have a large impact on performance. For example, choosing PatchSelect over strategy 3 for the raw SVM feature and classifier combination yields a pAUC improvement of 0.057. Furthermore, if strategy 6 is used for keypoint utilization, the raw SVM BTD algorithm would be considered among the worst performers among the six algorithms, whereas with PatchSelect, it is the best performer across all conditions. The variance in performance for a single feature and classifier combination suggests that choosing a poorly performing keypoint utilization strategy could negatively bias the results of a new BTD algorithm, which may have merit when accounting for the training and testing variance. Table I are shown with pAUC calculated up to an FAR of 0.005. Each group of 11 bars represents a separate feature and classifier combination (listed on the x-axis) where the random forest is denoted by "RF." The 11 bars can be compared for their effectiveness within group, and bars of the same color, representing the same strategy, can be compared across conditions. Each bar is the average performance obtained from bootstrapping the confidences 20 times, and the error bars represent one standard deviation.
Third, certain strategies are consistently among the top performers (e.g., strategies 3 and 5). The average rank of topperforming strategies such as 3 and 5 across the six BTD algorithms is 3 and 3.7, respectively. This suggests that certain practices are generally good for keypoint utilization when training and testing BTD algorithms. This result is important because it implies that by using those good practices as a strategy for keypoint utilization, the possible loss in performance will be due to the algorithm design and not due to how it is trained. Thus, using identified best practices simplifies evaluating the performance of BTD algorithms.
Fourth, Fig. 4 shows that PatchSelect outperforms all other strategies for the six BTD algorithms except for HOG-RF, where strategy 3 and PatchSelect are tied. We developed PatchSelect by identifying the best practices among other existing strategies and incorporating them into a single training and testing strategy. The practices suggested by PatchSelect seem to provide generally stable results even if the approach is changed slightly, as described in Section V. The limitations of this comparison and these conditions are discussed in Section VII.
Fifth, some strategies in the above comparison seem to consistently perform at the bottom. A caveat about these methods (in particular, [20] , [28] , strategies 7 and 4, respectively) is that they were designed for a different classification paradigm than the one used in this paper, namely, multiple-instance learning.
B. Performance Sensitivity to Varying pAUC Measures
The pAUC measures presented in Fig. 3 are computed over a specific range of FAR values (i.e., 0 to 0.005 FAR). This metric summarizes the performance of each classification algorithm only over the aforementioned FAR range, and therefore, the results may not hold for a different FAR range. In this section, we evaluate the pAUC of the classification models as we vary the FAR range in the pAUC computation. In particular, we vary the larger of the two FAR values, which we term FAR 2 , and compute the average pAUC of each keypoint utilization approach. These results are shown in Fig. 5 . The results of this analysis indicate that the rank order of different strategies remains relatively unchanged as the FAR range is varied. Further, for each FAR value, the pAUC of PatchSelect (strategy #11) is higher than that of any other strategy.
V. MOTIVATION FOR THE PATCHSELECT STRATEGY
To understand the specific parameter choices for PatchSelect given in Table I , a study of the design choices of existing methods is conducted in this section. As discussed in Section II, each strategy defines a particular way to train (e.g., use three keypoints at maximum energy locations for both classes) and a particular way to test (e.g., sum the top three decision statistics). The experiments in this section address the sensitivity in performance associated with these choices. For brevity, the results of these questions are shown here using the HOG feature with the random forest classifier (denoted HOG-RF). This choice is somewhat arbitrary, but it was chosen because trends exhibited by HOG-RF are fairly consistent across other features and classifiers. In addition, PatchSelect is shown in Fig. 4 to outperform other methods consistently across all tested BTD algorithms, suggesting that the conclusions drawn from HOG-RF are indeed general. Further, the comparison of performance as a function of the final FAR threshold in Section IV-B suggested that the rank ordering of the results is relatively insensitive to that threshold. For this reason, the results of these experiments are shown for a pAUC computed to an FAR of 0.005.
A. How Keypoints Should Be Chosen at Test Time: Energy or Classifier Confidence?
Strategies differ in their use of keypoints at test time, between energy and classifier decision statistics. In this section, we try to examine whether one of these two approaches tends to be superior to the other. To do this, we compared these two general approaches while controlling for many other experimental factors (e.g., different training strategies for threats and nonthreats). The results of this comparison are presented in Fig. 6 , which suggest that using the top decision statistics outperforms using decision statistics at maximum energy locations.
B. How Many Testing Keypoints Should Be Used?
In each strategy, the number of testing keypoints L has to be specified. In this section, we examine how to determine that number. This number depends on whether energy maxima, or decision statistics, are needed. The results presented in Fig. 6 suggest that using L = 4 for energy maxima works best, whereas 6 ≤ L ≤ 12 is more suitable when decision statistic locations are used.
C. How Should Nonthreat Training Keypoints Be Chosen?
While all existing utilization strategies train on data from maximum energy locations for threats, this is not the case for nonthreats. The methods compared in Table I utilize keypoints extracted at the top K locations (the same K is used for threat data) or at five regularly spaced indexes. In this section, we examine the choices for providing nonthreat training data to a classifier.
We note that there are two main differences between the two proposed H 0 approaches. The first is that extracting data at energy locations is a physics-based criterion, which may be superior to extracting data at regular intervals. (This may include data at regions outside nonthreat signatures and thereby negatively bias the classifier.) The second is that the approaches that extract data at regular intervals do so with more patches (5) than the energy-based methods. (The most is four patches.) Thus, performance improvements may be solely on the basis that more patches are being provided to the classifier when using the strategy of extracting data at regular intervals. For this reason, a third training condition is added where nonthreat patches are taken down the depth at every fourth location down the A-scan (82 patches per nonthreat observation in total), which corresponds to approximately 75% overlap between consecutive patches. This condition is added to test whether more data would improve classification performance. To present this comparison, the final confidence is computed on the top decision statistics, as this was shown in Section V-A to be superior. In Fig. 7 , the three methods for choosing training data representing nonthreat data are compared. During testing, the final confidence is obtained by summing the top L decision statistics. For all values of L, the strategy of providing more nonthreat data to the classifier improves performance (i.e., "down depth" method).
D. How Should Threat Training Keypoints Be Chosen?
The final design question we considered concerns the number of threat patches identified at the location of high energy that should be used in training. In this section, we address this question in the context of the answers obtained in the previous sections. Therefore, we train on nonthreat data extracted at small regular intervals; during testing, we summed the top L confidences. The results of these experiments are shown in Fig. 8 for HOG-RF. The results suggest that the best performance is achieved using K = 3, 4 for threat data.
VI. GENERAL INSIGHTS FOR CHOOSING TRAINING AND TESTING DATA FOR SUPERVISED ALGORITHMS
In this paper, we conducted several experiments to determine the strategies that are most effective for extracting training and testing data for supervised learning algorithms on GPR data. These results motivated the PatchSelect algorithm, and the best strategies for data extraction that were identified from the experiments are encoded in the design choices of PatchSelect (e.g., the number of keypoints to use during training or testing). Unfortunately, however, the PatchSelect design choices may depend upon other experimental factors, which may vary for other practitioners and researchers. Such variations may make it inappropriate to directly apply the same design choices recommended here to other data or experimental conditions, and therefore, it may be challenging for other researchers and practitioners to benefit from the findings here.
For example, the best data extraction and utilization strategies may depend upon the training and testing data patch sizes, or the smoothing parameter used in MSEK. These design choices themselves may depend upon the spatial and temporal sampling rate of the GPR, which is often beyond the control of the algorithm designer or researcher.
Therefore, in this section, we provide some more general insights regarding the PatchSelect parameters, such that they may be more easily translated, or adopted, by designers who have somewhat different experimental conditions. We do this by relating the PatchSelect parameters to more general characteristics of GPR imagery, or physical characteristics of the ground, and buried threats. First, we relate the MSEK parameters to the number of patches that are beneficial for training. Second, we describe the difference between keypoint identification during training and testing to motivate using decision statistics during testing.
A. Using Multiple Energy Locations for Algorithm Training
During algorithm training, energy is used as the criterion by which to identify locations at which to extract image patches. For six of the ten strategies listed in Table I , K = 1 image patch is used for algorithm training. However, the best classification performance in our experiments is achieved when K = 3 − 4 which corresponds to multiple patches per threat. This suggests that four keypoints may be enough, on average, to capture all the strong radar reflections returned when a buried threat is present in the subsurface. We use "reflections" to refer to the locations of strong negative or positive amplitudes in the GPR signal in the B-scans, which are always high-energy peaks in the A-scans. This can be seen in Fig. 9 , where we present the top four MSEK patches extracted over several representative buried threat instances.
In each of the six examples, the MSEK patches can be seen to concentrate around locations of threat reflections. In certain cases, such as in Fig. 9(a) , using four patches seems to be a bit excessive considering the temporal proximity of the patches, and therefore, they would contain very similar data. In contrast, in Fig. 9(b) , the four patches extend the length of the longer threat reflection. Similarly, in Fig. 9(c) where examples of threat reflections with two independent regions are shown, using four keypoints does appear consistent with the goal of capturing the entire threat signal.
The examples of MSEK patches extracted for different threats suggest that an important characteristic of a patch- selection method is the ability to capture the average number of reflections over a buried threat. We expect these reflections to be relatively consistent across different GPR sensors despite some temporal/spatial sampling differences between the systems. It is important, however, that the smoothing parameter of MSEK (or other energy-based keypoint detectors) as well as the patch size be adjusted based on the sampling rate of the GPR. Selecting the MSEK parameter is an important consideration to avoid smoothing out the individual threat reflections. Similarly, the patch size was selected to include the reflections associated with the threat signal without including substantial background data. We expect that if the patch-size criterion is kept the same then the spatial/temporal extent identified to capture the threat reflections in other contexts will be similar to the one identified here. Conversely, we expect that performance would suffer if algorithm design (e.g., keypoint utilization) is not adapted accordingly. If these conditions are met, we expect that K = 4 will be robust across many algorithm design conditions due to its dependence on phenomena inherent to buried threats in GPR data.
B. Choosing Decision Statistics During Testing
During the algorithm training procedure, it is necessary to use signal energy as a crude proxy with which the temporal location of buried threat signals is identified (e.g., with the MSEK algorithm). In contrast, however, during testing, a trained classification model is available. The decision statistics assigned by the classifier are, by design, much more effective predictors of the presence of a buried threat than that of energy. Therefore, in PatchSelect, and other approaches, the classifier is applied down the temporal axis, and high confidence locations are assumed to be the best candidates for the presence of a buried threat (if it is present).
The aforementioned logic is reflected in the testing approach adopted by PatchSelect, and the approaches that inspired it, whereby a small subset of highest confidence temporal locations are summed together to obtain a final prediction of the presence of a buried threat. Through empirical experimentation, we found that testing at temporal locations on the central A-scan and summing the top 12 decision statistics yielded the best (i.e., most discriminative) estimate for the presence of a threat.
Because the estimation procedure for identifying locations between training and testing is different, the number of locations is expected to be different. Whereas in training, local maxima are taken, in testing, the top L locations are chosen. These locations, however, are shown in Fig. 10 to be relatively near the MSEK locations. For example, for 6 ≤ L ≤ 12, more than 70% of decision statistics are within two pixels of one of the four MSEK locations. This suggests that by using the classifier to identify the locations at which to test, locations that are generally more threatlike are found than the data at the locations of highest energy. While using L = 12 is the result from our comparison, we expect that using the classifier to identify locations at which to test rather than the energy will be useful in other contexts as well.
VII. CONCLUSION AND UTILIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS
In this paper, the question of how to choose training and testing data for supervised GPR BTD algorithms is addressed. Training and testing data consist of small patches of GPR imagery, which we refer to here as "keypoints." While most algorithms in the GPR literature identify keypoints in a very similar fashion, there is much variability in how they are utilized once they are identified. In this context, utilization refers to several design questions: choosing, among identified keypoints, which keypoints should be provided to supervised classifiers (during training); to which keypoints the classifier should be applied during testing; and how a final decision statistic (or confidence) should be computed using the keypoints. A large variety of methods have been proposed in the literature for this purpose, and it is unclear as to which approaches are best, or whether any methods are superior to others.
In order to address these questions, we compared the effectiveness of many existing keypoint utilization approaches on a large GPR data set and using a variety of different classifiers and features from the GPR literature. We also proposed a new method, called PatchSelect, which was designed based on insights from our experiments in this paper. Based on the results, several conclusions can be drawn.
1) The choice of utilization strategy has a significant impact on the detection performance of the resulting supervised algorithm. 2) There are utilization practices that generally yield better results. 3) We combined the best identified practices to create the PatchSelect strategy, which (in our experiments) is always superior. In addition to our large-scale comparison, we also conducted several smaller experiments (Section V) to elucidate which utilization practices yield the best results. These experiments also motivated the design of PatchSelect. Finally, in Section VI, we connected the design choices identified in this paper to inherent qualities of GPR imagery, such as the number of reflections or the relative size of the threat signature (with respect to pixel size). We have added this in the hope that other practitioners could apply the lessons from this paper to their data set if it has a similar difficulty in defining the threat signal.
